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Book Review
Brainard, Marcus, Belief and its Neutralization: Husserl’s System of Phe-
nomenology in Ideas I, State University of New York Press, 2002, 331 pp,
$29.95 (paperback), ISBN 0-7914-5220-4.
Brainard’s book provides an original and careful analysis that genuinely de-
serves public discussion. The attempt to bring Husserl’s overall project to
evidence through a thorough reconstruction of Ideas I is a highly ambitious
enterprise. Brainard, in many places in this book, succeeds at giving con-
cise and exceptionally lucid explanations of key Husserlian concepts under-
stood within the larger framework of Husserlian phenomenology. However,
Brainard’s approach, though to be commended for its originality and audac-
ity, also comes up against serious difficulties, which I will discuss in what
follows. These difficulties have largely to do with the fact that this book
– mirroring a tension obvious in Husserl’s own attempts at introductions –
struggles with its task and purpose. On the one hand, one cannot expect the
detail and extended critical discussion demanded of a research monograph
from an introduction. On the other hand, Brainard’s book clearly is much
more than that: it intends an eidetic analysis of phenomenology as such.
Thus, the omissions and generalisations that would have been acceptable
in a project less ambitious in this case run the risk of turning into serious
deficits.
Brainard’s ambitious goals are already reflected in the somewhat surprising
title of his book: Husserl’s System of Phenomenology in Ideas I. It is, after
all, by no means uncontroversial that Husserl offered a system at all, let alone
in Ideas I – the most prominent of Husserl’s failed attempts to provide an
introduction into phenomenology. In fact, though not always openly, the sim-
ple but potentially grave mistake of ‘only’ having read Ideas I, is often taken
as one important cause of typical misunderstandings of Husserl’s project. By
concentrating on Ideas I Brainard clearly sets himself apart from other sys-
tematic reconstructions, most obviously from Donn Welton’s comprehensive
The Other Husserl (2000). From the outset, then, the reader is prepared for
a, in the best sense of the word, ‘unconventional’ journey through otherwise
well-trod territory.
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I.
In the introduction to his book, Brainard sets himself a three-fold task:
1. “. . . to demonstrate the systematic character of the whole of his work –
on the example of Ideas I.” This entails “(1) The establishment of the
priority of essence over fact; (2) the location of and entry into the a
priori, phenomenological sphere; (3) the explication of intentionality in
terms of the noetic-noematic correlation; (4) the identification of the doxic
“underground” of noetic activity; (5) the explication of the “objectual”
underground or reference in the noema; and (6) the explication of reason
or rationality.” (xviii)
2. “. . . to elaborate Husserl’s doctrine of the neutrality modification” which
“reveals the basis of conscious life: belief.” (xviii)
3. and finally, to “exhibit this basis [belief] as such,” which “forms the third
and unifying intention of the present study.” (xviii)
The five chapters of the book are set up to meet these three goals in the
following way:
In Chapter 1 Brainard gives a provisional outline of what he calls “the
task of Husserlian thought,” which was conceived by Husserl as a response
to a crisis of the sciences and of philosophy. In this context, he stresses the
“practical impulse” of Husserl’s work, which is the focus and remains the
foundation throughout Brainard’s study. In Chapter II Brainard reconstructs
Husserl’s distinction between essence and fact in order to reassess the role
and function of the epoche´. In Chapter III he presents the universal structures
of consciousness and the noesis/noema relation while giving particular con-
sideration to Husserl’s notion of modifications and to belief neutralisation.
Chapter IV is a detailed discussion of the meaning and significance of reason
and rationality for Husserl’s system of phenomenology. Finally, Chapter V
returns to Husserl’s understanding of the task of phenomenology. In this last
chapter the full scope of Brainard’s interpretation comes to the fore. For here
he advances Husserl’s understanding of this task as the “idea of phenomenol-
ogy” that “indicates the way in which his undertaking remains paradigmatic
for all other positions that would make their appearance as phenomenology.”
(xix; my emphasis)
Soon it becomes clear, that the most interesting aspect of Brainard’s book
lies not so much in the explications and reconstructions he provides, or even
in the particular claims he puts forward. What is special and philosophically
most interesting about this book is the overall approach Brainard chose to
take – this is a conscious and reflected choice, as the important and care-
fully laid out methodological preface testifies. Brainard acknowledges that
his “study is intended to be an introduction to Husserlian phenomenology.”
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(xvii) This does not sound all too unusual and has been done – and better –
by Bernet/Kern/Marbach, Sokolowski, Waldenfels, Welton, Zahavi and many
others. However, what makes Brainard’s commentary different from most is
that its emphasis clearly is on the “sense and ethos” of Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy. And despite Brainard’s overzealous aim to “grasp his [Husserl’s] thought
completely” (xv), he must first of all be commended for something that is
not immediately obvious in everybody’s work: a genuine interest in the au-
thor and his writings. It is a strength of this book that there is no doubt that
Brainard sincerely attempts to understand before he criticizes, to listen before
he speaks, to take Husserl “at his word, listening all the while for its sense”
(xvi).
However, Brainard also admits to listen (and to speak) from a non-
Husserlian perspective – an admission that he does not further clarify. The
key to this perspective, which remains unidentified, is Brainard’s firm distinc-
tion between Thought and Being. The methodological premise is that one can
approach Husserl’s Thought without taking recourse to Being, that is, without
understanding Thought as something that should be taken in its appearance as
phenomenon. This procedure involves what Brainard calls the “logotectonic
epoche´”. Unfortunately he explains this peculiar type of epoche´ only in a
footnote, while even this footnote remains to a large degree obscure:
From the standpoint of the present study, to reduce thought to phenomenon
is to commit a metabasis. This is admittedly not Husserl’s position, and
therefore indicates that the framing considerations advanced here – and
they are precisely that: framing – have their place outside the horizon of
this thought. The advantage of approaching his thought from the outside
(and that, among other things, is what we hope to demonstrate here) is
that one is in a better position to account for that thought as it articulated
itself – provided, of course, that one does not lose sight of what is and what
is not properly Husserlian and so does not fall victim to another kind of
metabasis. The logotectonic epoche´ enables one to give each thought its
due – in this case, Husserl’s thought. (Note 16, p. 232f.)
Under the scope of the logotectonic epoche´, then, thought is detemporalized
and denaturalized and grasped as an alterity that stands out against the flux
of its development as well as against the perspective of any reflection on it.
(5) In Brainard’s view, it is precisely his awareness of the alterity of Husserl’s
thought that allows him to step out of a mere rehearsal of Husserlian phrases.
In his words, it enables him to
. . . ask the truly radical questions: What is it and why? Only after having
answered these questions is one in a position to decide in a meaningful
way whether is it possible, to say nothing of desirable or legitimate, to
seek to continue that thought, even if the continuation in question is of
modification and supplementation (as it usually is in scholarship). It is
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within the horizon of these questions that the urgency of the issue of a
thought’s finitude makes itself felt most intensely. With respect to Husserl’s
endeavour, one then must ask: Is (Husserlian) phenomenology perennial
or infinite? And if so, what would that mean? Or is it instead finite? And if
so, what are the consequences of its finitude, not only for scholarship, but
for thought taken as a whole?” (Note 16, p. 232f.)
Thus it becomes clear that what can at first sight be misunderstood as ‘just’
another introduction into Husserlian phenomenology, or even into Ideas I more
narrowly, really is a book on the essential (in the technical sense) questions of
phenomenology. He wants to bring the idea, or the essence of phenomenology
into view. This is why for Brainard, the “task” or “purpose” of Husserlian
phenomenology gains such critical importance. “To ask after the Why of
phenomenology is to seek to grasp the sense, the task of Husserlian thought.”
(xix) Against the now common position that an appropriate understanding of
Husserl’s phenomenology must involve a view on his full oeuvre, Brainard
proposes a “static analysis.” Rather than emphasising the development of
Husserl’s thought, including differences and discrepancies between different
works, Brainard wants
. . . only to make visible what is identical, though initially hidden, within
the multiplicity, and thus to confirm by ‘natural’ means the singularity of
Husserl’s mission. The ‘hidden sense’ of a thought will remain hidden so
long as one regards that thought as part of a continuum or as in flux. The
key is to take the thought on its own and seek the invariant among the
variations, whether they be of Being or time. For sense is unchanging. . .
Change is not the issue here, but rather that which abides. (xix)
In other words, Brainard attempts nothing less than an eidetic analysis of
Husserlian phenomenology; even more: of phenomenology as such. For in his
view, the essence of Husserlian phenomenology also predelineates the sense of
any (other) phenomenology; it is the essence, the condition of possibilities of
phenomenology as such. Partial phenomenological analyses (of the Husserlian
or non-Husserlian kind) must be understood as variations of the one eidos of
phenomenology. “In constructing the idea of phenomenology, Husserl projects
the lines along which phenomenology is to develop: from ground up into the
heights, or from the pure ego up to absolute reason or God. There are the limits
of his system and as such frame the striving peculiar to phenomenology.”
(xviii f.)
At this point, Brainard breathes life and passion into a work not necessarily
known for its gusto and fervour. “Striving,” “struggling,” “awakening” are
reoccurring key words that Brainard uses to capture the “ethos” of Husserl’s
writings. But this is much more than the attempt to highlight Husserl’s rhetoric;
for Brainard wants to show that the “sense” of Husserl’s writings and the
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“striving,” which they betray, are interconnected. In the introduction Brainard
writes:
Striving is never aimless but has a sense. Its sense as directedness is to
move from lower to higher, from unconscious to conscious, from irrational
to rational. Its sense as meaning or telos is absolute rationality or harmony.
The span of striving extends from the origins – ultimately from the origin
– up to the Logos, which for Husserl is the Word, but also absolute reason.
The sense of this striving is the sense of his thought; it is captured in the
system of transcendental phenomenology. (xv)
Husserl’s thought, in other words, cannot be separated from the rhetoric of
striving that he used to express it; it is “borne by a personal ethos” (7) that
therefore essentially belongs to it. At this point Brainard’s methodological
approach and his philosophico-systematic concerns intersect. The following
five chapters are meant to uncover, disentangle and display the system of
transcendental phenomenology.
II.
Chapter 1 “The Task of Thinking” picks up on the methodological theme
presented in the introduction and explores Brainard’s notion of an “idea of
phenomenology” further. It firmly establishes Husserl as a “foundationalist”
(3) who believes not only in phenomenology as a science of essences but also
believes that phenomenology itself has an essence. “There is no ‘royal road’
into phenomenology and therefore none into philosophy. There is only the one
road prescribed by phenomenology’s own essence” (Ideas I, 201). Brainard
gives this claim more weight than it is usually given and takes it to mean that
phenomenology ought to cohere with this essence if it is to be phenomenology
proper. The “normative function of essence” (2) prescribes essential possibil-
ities for any phenomenology. Any attempt to grasp Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy systematically therefore must aim at capturing this essence. “For it is the
Why (here the dynamis) that lends unity and thus determinacy to the What
(Husserl’s thought as a whole) and thereby makes clear its singularity amidst
the multiplicity of other thoughts, to say nothing of other ‘phenomenologies.”’
(4)
This Why, however, is precisely not found (or at least not easily) in Ideas I.
Therefore, Brainard begins his determination of the dynamis of phenomenol-
ogy by looking at the Crisis, the ‘mature sense-formation’ of Husserl’s thought.
He thereby seeks to establish the general crisis of the sciences and of Euro-
pean culture as the Why of phenomenology. Brainard stresses that this crisis
is first and foremost a crisis triggered by relativism, which he uses to support
his strong emphasis on Husserl’s foundationalism and essentialism. Again,
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Brainard brings out Husserl’s personal investment in this project: “. . . his life-
or-death struggle is an all-or-nothing struggle: ‘Only one thing can fulfil me: I
must gain clarity, otherwise I cannot live; I cannot bear life if I cannot believe
that I shall gain the ability to look actually into the promised land, on my own
and with clear eyes.’ Husserl regards himself as wandering through the desert
of skepticism (and dogmatism). He is at once Moses and Columbus: he is
seeking the way into the ‘new world.’ And only clarity will grant him safe
passage.” (9)
This line of thought, however, reflects the tension in Husserl’s writing be-
tween seeing himself as part, even as culmination point, of a tradition on
the one hand, and, on the other, wanting to place himself outside this very
tradition and establish a new beginning or a ‘new world.’ Especially for read-
ers who genuinely need an introduction into Husserl’s phenomenology, this
is an important issue. Brainard does little to clarify or even to dissolve this
tension. He restricts himself to echo Husserl’s contradictory statements. On
the one hand, “Husserl does not and, for principal reasons, cannot stand in
any tradition.” (14) In the introduction, Brainard makes this point even more
drastically: “Edmund Husserl was not a philosopher, nor was his thought phi-
losophy.” (xiii; cf. also 102) On the other hand, however, Brainard seems to
believe, with Husserl, that transcendental phenomenology is the final form
of a teleologically understood philosophy. (19) We see here early on a deficit
that runs through this book: Even though Brainard made a methodological
choice “to take Husserl at his word,” this decision itself is problematic. It
means that there is hardly any critical discussion of Husserl’s views in this
book. One might say that this is to be expected of a book that is meant to be a
“mere” introduction. However, this book clearly is not meant to be just that.
In fact, it is a comprehensive reconstruction and ostentatious endorsement
of Husserl’s project. As such, it would have made a much stronger case if it
had acknowledged at least the most obvious problems and issues raised by
Husserl’s writings.
Among these obvious issues is for example Husserl’s notion of the human
being as “animal rationale” (16), which reflects his – now often criticised –
faith in reason and rationality. When Brainard quotes Husserl as claiming that
“being human is a being teleological and being what one ought to be (Ideas I,
275/341)” (17), he does so without showing any awareness of the problematic
nature of such a claim. Neither does Brainard find any reason to criticise or at
least demonstrate a critical distance from Husserl’s obvious Euro-centrism.1
None of the existing papers of the topic are cited. It would have been easy to
avoid this situation by omitting this element from his reconstruction altogether.
Instead he decides to quote laconically:
European humanness is also considered to have had and still have such
a function with regard to humanity as a whole. Thus the crisis addressed
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here is not confined to Husserl’s Europe but is actually of global propor-
tions – as would be its resolution. Thus there is a telescopic, founded
relationship: from (European) philosophy to European humanness to hu-
manity as a whole; the first is to lead the next and it in turn is to lead
humanity. (18)
III.
Yet another widely debated issue in Husserl’s phenomenology is his alleged
solipsism. In Chapter 2 “Phenomenological Propaedeutics,” Brainard draws
no attention to this debate (or even just to the issue) but instead reproduces
Husserl’s claim without adding any further explanation or critical layer:
Husserl’s observations focus on the individual ego and its stream; he does
not rule out a collectivity of egos, but the absoluteness of the stream and its
lived experiences is confined to each individual ego and cannot be trans-
ferred to a collectivity – at least not yet. Whatever problems his incipient
“solipsism” may pose for his thought, he must begin at the beginning, and
that means with subjectivity – in its necessary individually – before turning
to intersubjectivity; the latter topic lies on a high level of inquiry within
the system of Husserlian thought. (92)
The issue of intersubjectivity already comes up earlier in the book when
Brainard explicates the two-foldedness of Husserl’s notion of a “critique of
reason.” The critique of reason must be understood as both a critique concern-
ing the individual subject and a critique concerning humanity in its sociality
and historicity. The first yields a static analysis of reason, the second a genetic
analysis of the teleology of rationality. (15) It surprises to find that although
Brainard cites Anthony Steinbock here, he does not cite his Home and Be-
yond and makes no mention of the concept of generative phenomenology,
not even in a footnote. Brainard claims to have made a conscious decision
against including secondary literature and other commentaries. “Rather than
become embroiled in the debates surrounding certain key issues in Husserlian
thought . . . , we thus follow Husserl’s example of not entering into the debate
centering on epistemological or other problems for their own sake. In order to
remain true to the course of Ideas I, he notes that he “must remain in a state of
innocence.” See Hua III/2, 279, as well as ibid., 559.4–6. (note 21, 233) It is
true that this “innocence” was characteristic of Husserl’s work. Although he
later began to deal with other thinkers, such as Descartes and Kant, more sys-
tematically, the present reader is sometimes baffled by the lack of references
and the decidedly non-scholarly discussions of the history of philosophy. For
Husserl, this made good sense. However, for a Husserlian today, a member
of a community of Husserlians and other phenomenologists, not the same
innocence can be achieved nor desired. Although Husserl attempted to make
84
a new start and to lay new foundations for science and philosophy, it makes
no sense for every phenomenologist to do so; arguably it is not even possible,
especially if one sets out to write on Husserl’s work.
A final issue that must be mentioned here because it belongs to the most
controversial moments of this study, is Brainard’s insistence on highlighting
an aspect of Husserl’s thought that is usually downplayed in the literature: a
theological reading of absolute reason and the teleological nature of rationality
(although Brainard admits that Husserl’s notion of God can be called vague
at best, 131; see fn. 44). As Brainard sees it, the ‘system’ that he wants to lay
out in his book gains regulative direction by precisely this theology. It has two
poles: its lowermost limit in the foundational layers of consciousness. “This
is the ground from which alone one can rigorously and “ethically” work up
into the heights, and in fact asymptotically up towards the uppermost limit,
which is God, or ‘absolute reason.”’ (13)
As a means of defending his interpretation, Brainard does not hesitate
to heavily criticise (unnamed) scholars who regard God as a problematic
but ultimately inessential element of Husserlian phenomenology. He attacks
them in the same breath as those who take seriously the charge of Husserlian
solipsism. I quote in full:
. . . the fact that the presence of an uppermost limit – as such – has generally
been overlooked by Husserl scholars may be explained variously. Firstly,
whereas Husserl’s notion of God has been discussed in several studies, it has
been treated in large part as a mere problem, with little if any connection to
the whole of Husserlian thought. Secondly, and perhaps the most important
reason for the neglect of this feature of his thought – beyond the inattention
to the fact that Husserlian thought is conceived of by its founder as a whole,
albeit as an infinite whole, which is to say: beyond the general inattention
to the demonstrable systematicity of his endeavour – is the unpopularity
of what Husserl has actually thought: both his foundational intention and
his principal focus on the pure ego and on pure consciousness, thus on
subjectivity rather than on intersubjectivity. The abhorrence of such an
approach is audible, however, not only in the neglect of Husserl’s talk of
God as he bears on the beginning, but also in the charges of solipsism
brought against him. Whatever the causes, the whole of Husserlian thought
and the role the task plays in fixing that whole have as a rule been neglected.
The reason for the neglect boils down to a lack of radicality among scholars,
and in fact to a lack of the most genuine radicality – that impels one to
attend not simply to origins, but to beginnings, to beginnings that for their
part are determinative of the whole of a thought. (27)
Such zeal astonishes but also alienates at times. One is reminded of the
fact that the scientific natural view was once introduced against theological
metaphysics and one cannot but wonder whether, in turn, the overcoming of
the scientific view might not force phenomenology into a position where the
risk of getting too close to such a metaphysics becomes a problem. At the
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same time, however, it must be acknowledged that Brainard’s way of taking
Husserl’s writings seriously produces some of the clearest and most careful
explanations of those elements of Husserlian phenomenology that are gener-
ally considered the most obscure. Often, what is most ‘obscure’ in Husserl is
still what differs most radically from precisely the ‘scientific view.’ One key
example here is Husserl’s notion of intuition and a way of clarifying phenom-
ena that is not based on deductive reasoning but on intuitive demonstration.
Brainard does an excellent job at making this method understandable and at
showing its own evidential force (see 55 ff.). Equally clear and convincing
are his explanations in Chapter II: Phenomenological Propaedeutics of the
fact-essence and the possibility-necessity dichotomies as well as the notion
of sense and the methodological concept of epoche´, which are so important
for Husserl’s phenomenology.
IV.
In Chapter III: The Disclosure of the System’s Lowermost Limit: Subjectiv-
ity, Brainard finally addresses some of the most standard objections to phe-
nomenology: 1. the issue of the phenomenologist’s self-exclusion under the
epoche´ and the remaining transcendental consciousness as its correlate; 2.
the problem of phenomenological self-reflection ; and 3. the difficulty of the
use and justification of concepts within the frame of the phenomenological
method. In a move that reflects the strengths and weaknesses of Brainard’s
study as a whole, he succeeds at convincingly and clearly laying out the ob-
jections and replies while failing, however, to exceed a reconstruction of the
Husserlian position – again a move that Brainard presents as a conscious de-
cision early on: “The task here is therefore not to solve his problems, but, in
light of them, trace the contours of the task, the lines along which Husserl’s
endeavour unfolds”. (xviii) But there is also no indication that Brainard finds
anything plausible in the objections and, again, he does not refer to ongoing
critical debates on these issues. The fact that he wants to give a “static analy-
sis” – although justifiable as a methodological decision – causes problems at
times. For example, when Brainard explicates Husserl’s different notions of
representation, in particular the role that phantasy plays for eidetic intuition
and its relation to the neutrality modification, the neglect of other works be-
sides Ideas I causes imprecision. The same holds for Brainard’s discussion of
time-consciousness. In both cases, it has been established recently not only
how much Husserl’s earlier and later accounts differ but also how significant
these differences are for his theory.2
This is not to say that it could have been demanded of this book to pro-
vide a complete reconstruction of Husserl’s thought. No introduction can be
expected to do so. However, Brainard’s own confidence to have delivered a
systematic overview creates a tension between the inevitable incompleteness
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of any introduction (a problem that Husserl himself was so conscious of) and
the claim that this incompleteness can be overcome by an insight into the
essence of the Husserlian account.
V.
The plan of presenting a systematic whole while neglecting detail works much
better in IV. Towards the System’s Uppermost Limit: Reason. Here Brainard
gives a very helpful introduction to the complex problem of reason and
to related phenomena of consciousness constitution. Especially laudable is
Brainard’s attempt to capture the range and coherence of Husserl’s project in
its different dimensions: subjectivity, intersubjectivity, reason and rational-
ity (216). Curious, albeit consistent with a static analysis, is the lack of any
mention of historicity.3
Again, the focus on Ideas I explains the omission while the pretense of
delivering the essence of Husserl’s thought turns the omission into a deficit.
However, here, at the very latest, one would expect a thorough discussion of
Husserl’s transcendental idealism, which is precisely what makes Ideas I into
a pivotal moment of Husserl’s work. But, as the talk of Being and Thought
might already suggest, Brainard does not seem to think of this issue as central.
Surely this must be one of the aspects of the book that remain most difficult
to defend.
However, the boldest step in Brainard’s study is yet to come. In Chapter V:
The Phenomenological Movement the full scope of Brainard’s claims comes
to the fore. Just as he takes Husserl’s view as outlined in Ideas I as one man-
ifestation of the essence of Husserlian phenomenology, he takes Husserlian
phenomenology to be one variation of the eidos of phenomenology in general.
Thus he intends his investigation to be an eidetic analysis of phenomenology
as such, or, in other words, the answer to the question:
What is phenomenology? Is it a style, a trend, a school, or a movement of
thought? Can it even be spoken of in the singular? (219)
For Brainard the answer is evident:
Assuming that it makes sense to speak of “the” phenomenological move-
ment, then the source of its sense is to be found in the movement of phe-
nomenology as it is prescribed by the latter’s task. This task is rooted, in
turn, in the beginning of that movement, which is to be found nowhere else
save in Husserlian thought. (Ibid.)
The sui generis task of phenomenology, in Brainard’s view, is therefore
equally obvious. It lies in bringing about the complete rationalisation of both
humanity and the individual self; for the “genuine life is the rational life.”
(220)
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Of course, Brainard expects opposition to his three-fold claim that, first,
there is an identifiable essence of phenomenology, second, it is identical with
specifically Husserlian phenomenology, and finally third, it can be made evi-
dent by an analysis of Ideas I alone. Here, once again, it astonishes with what
ease Brainard makes the decision to ignore both the Logical Investigations
and Husserl’s later work. He responds to these obvious – and, may I say, well
founded – objections by saying:
One must keep one’s terms straight. Not simply out of pedantry, but in
order to preserve differences. By denying the name ‘phenomenology’ to
any position other than Husserl’s, the intention is not to deny the value of
that other position. On the contrary, by acknowledging the finitude of the
Husserlian project – that is, the parameters it set for itself in its task – it
becomes possible to free other positions from the academic continuum and
approach them in their own terms, in their own right. This alone enables one
to discern the difference they make and thereby to accord their achievements
the respect they deserve. (221f.)
However, his pledge to do justice to positions “other than Husserl’s” – if not
as phenomenologies – fails to convince, since Brainard unmistakably states
that the so-called “phenomenological movement is nothing but a movement
away from phenomenology. It is precisely a straying from the path his task
established. (222)
For Brainard, to deliver an introduction into Husserlian phenomenology is
tantamount to presenting its purpose and goal. It would be difficult to disagree
with Brainard if it was not for the fact that he uses “purpose and goal” in
the singular. For others (and this would certainly include myself) might be
more reluctant to believe that Brainard (or anyone else for that matter) could
identify the one sense in which Husserl must be understood. Especially given
its decidedly theological overtones (see chapter 3), this one sense is far more
controversial than Brainard makes it out to be. But even if Brainard achieved
the uncovering of what Husserl took to be the ‘whole sense’ of his work, it is not
immediately obvious that one should prefer a reconstruction of what Husserl
might or might not have had in mind when he worked, to an investigation into
what Husserl’s thought has to offer for one’s own, contemporary concerns (of
which an ultimately theological grounding of an entire system of rationality
might not be part).
Brainard’s “introduction” thus stands in stark contrast with other avail-
able introductions. He ignores the development of Husserl’s thought, as well
as the breadth of his concerns, as they are masterfully laid out in Bernet/
Kern/Marbach’s An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (1993);
more recently, in Dan Zahavi’s Husserl’s Phenomenology (2003); and, most
thoroughly in Donn Welton’s The Other Husserl (2002) – a systematic
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reconstruction of Husserl’s works that does not even pretend to be “intro-
ductory.” Neither does he ever step away from the strictly Husserlian project
in order to bring out general phenomenological questions and methods, as did
Robert Sokolowski in Introduction to Phenomenology (2000) and, even more
so, Don Ihde in his still original Experimental Phenomenology (1986). None
of these other introductions make any claim as to the exclusive validity of
specifically Husserl’s thought. In fact, as Bernhard Waldenfels’ Einfu¨hrung
in die Pha¨nomenologie (1992) demonstrates, there is a strong sense of a phe-
nomenological method and ethos that has come to not only encompass differ-
ent traditions within philosophy but has, from very early on, reached beyond
philosophy into the social, human, and indeed natural sciences. Thus, although
Husserl remains its undisputed “Ur-Stifter,” phenomenology undoubtedly is
“in lebendiger Fortarbeit begriffen” (Hua VI, 366) and can derive its coher-
ence, if at all, only from a “concrete historical a priori” (Hua VI, 380f.) to
which it is subject.
Nonetheless, and despite of the obvious difficulties that are manifest in
Brainard’s analysis, this book succeeds in very important ways that lie at
the very heart of the Husserlian project. It is indeed rare that we find such
radical methodological reflection in an introduction to any work or thinker.
Usually, commentators are satisfied with a clear, coherent and appropriate re-
construction of a particular philosophical system or project. The question of
the purpose and sense of that very project – what Brainard calls “the Why of
phenomenology” (xix; 4 passim) – is typically ignored. Regardless of whether
one is convinced by Brainard’s account, he does face up to this question and
takes for granted neither phenomenology’s value nor its status as “infinite
project” (i.e. a project that continues to be meaningful and significant). Fi-
nally, Brainard reawakens a belief in reason and a genuine interest in the
phenomenon and thereby takes up what Husserl considered “the deepest re-
sponsibility of the philosopher – and of the phenomenologist before him – as
the ‘functionary of humanity”’ (31). He does so in the sense that, although
he might instil more unbelief than belief in some of his readers, he definitely
makes it hard to remain indifferent to what he says. And thus, although I would
argue with Brainard on several accounts, and although at the very least I see
serious problems in Brainard’s apparent lack of criticism towards Husserl, I
do so passionately. And there is a sense in which such passion and belief are
precious and hard to come by in philosophy as well as in phenomenology.
Notes
1. See for example Klaus Held, “Husserls These von der Europaeisierung der Menschheit,”
and “Heimwelt, Fremdwelt, die eine Welt.”
2. With regards to imagination and phantasy see Rudolf Bernet, “Unconscious conscious-
ness in Husserl and Freud.” See also Julia Jansen, “On the development of Husserl’s
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transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research”,
and “Phantasy’s Systematic Place in Husserl’s Work: On the Condition of Possibility for
a Phenomenology of Experience.” With regards to time-consciousness see for example
John Brough, “Introduction,” in: Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Con-
sciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917). With regards to intersubjectivity see Dan Zahavi,
Self-Awareness and Alterity. For a thorough systematic overview of Husserl’s entire work
see Donn Welton, The Other Husserl.
3. Brainard refers to Anthony Steinbock but fails to take into account Steinbock’s major work
Home and Beyond.
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